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I. INTRODUCTION
ONSUMER welfare is the common concern of the antitrust laws
and the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices - Consumer Protection
Act (DTPA).1 Antitrust, however, is primarily addressed to the
*B.B.A., St. Mary's University; J.D., Baylor University; Shareholder, Cox Smith
Matthews Incorporated, San Antonio, Texas.
** B.A., Brandeis University; J.D., Hastings College of the Law; Partner, Pulman,
Cappuccio, Pullen & Benson LLP, San Antonio, Texas.
*** B.A., Texas A&M University; M.Ed., Texas State University, J.D., Southern Meth-
odist University Dedman School of Law; Partner, Spivey Valenciano, PLLC, San Antonio,
Texas.
1. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-63 (West 2011). Section 17.50(a) of the
DTPA provides:
A consumer may maintain an action where any of the following constitute a
producing cause of economic damages or damages for mental anguish:
(1) the use or employment by any person of a false, misleading, or deceptive
act or practice that is: (A) specifically enumerated in a subdivision of Subsec-
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misuse of market power to harm consumers, while the DTPA focuses on
consumer harm brought about through deception.2 The antitrust laws
and the DTPA, therefore, are best viewed as focusing on complementary
aspects of consumer welfare.
This Article covers significant developments under the federal and
Texas antitrust laws and the DTPA during the Survey period, November
1, 2010, through October 31, 2011.
II. ANTITRUST
The past year has been a quiet one for antitrust law. Neither the
United States Supreme Court nor the Texas Supreme Court issued any
antitrust decisions since last year's Survey. The Texas state courts of ap-
peal likewise issued no reported antitrust decisions in the past year, and
only two Fifth Circuit opinions and two Texas federal district court opin-
ions touched antitrust issues.
A. INTERSTATE COMMERCE REQUIREMENT
In Gulf Coast Hotel-Motel Ass'n v. Mississippi Gulf Coast Golf Course
Ass'n, the Fifth Circuit reversed a district court's dismissal of an antitrust
claim for failure to plead a connection to interstate commerce.3 The case
involved competing programs for the sale of vouchers for rounds of golf
at courses located along the Mississippi Gulf Coast. 4 The complaint al-
leged that customers for the vouchers were drawn from outside Missis-
sippi, but the district court nonetheless held that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the federal antitrust claims because the plaintiff's allega-
tions "were insufficiently detailed" to plead a substantial effect on inter-
state commerce. 5 The Sherman Act's reach has been described as
"coextensive with the reach of congressional power under the Commerce
Clause," which itself has been broadly interpreted when economic activ-
ity is involved. 6 A plaintiff is not required to quantify the adverse impact
on interstate commerce, but merely to show that there was some effect.7
Applying this framework, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the complaint,
while sparse, alleged an effect on the economic activity of "bringing out-
tion (b) of Section 17.46 of this subchapter; and (B) relied on by a consumer
to the consumer's detriment;
(2) breach of an express or implied warranty;
(3) any unconscionable action or course of action by any person; or
(4) the use or employment by any person of an act or practice in violation of
Chapter 541, Insurance Code.
Id. § 17.50(a).
2. See id. § 17.44(a); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 342 (1979); Roy B. Tay-
lor Sales, Inc. v. Hollymatic Corp., 28 F.3d 1379, 1382 (5th Cir. 1994).
3. Gulf Coast Hotel-Motel Ass'n v. Miss. Gulf Coast Golf Course Ass'n, 658 F.3d
500, 502 (5th Cir. 2011).
4. Id. at 502.
5. Id. at 503-04.
6. Id. at 504-05.
7. Id. at 505.
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of-state tourists to hotels to play golf," which was sufficient to establish
the nexus to interstate commerce required to establish jurisdiction over
the antitrust claims.8
B. THE POLITICAL QUESTION AND ACT OF STATE DOCTRINES
In Spectrum Stores, Inc. v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed dismissal of claims that several non-sovereign producers of refined
petroleum products had conspired with OPEC members to fix prices in
the United States.9 While the case began as five consolidated lawsuits, by
the time it reached the Fifth Circuit, the case concerned two antitrust
class actions brought by gasoline retailers against oil production compa-
nies. The district court determined that both complaints "challenge[d]
the traditional structure of international energy policy" by alleging a
price-fixing conspiracy involving OPEC member nations and their
wholly-owned oil production companies and subsidiaries. 10
The Fifth Circuit first considered whether the claims were barred by
the political question doctrine. On this issue, the court treated the de-
fendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion as a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction." Quoting Japan Whaling Ass'n v.
American Cetacean Society, the court described the political question
doctrine as "exclud[ing] from judicial review those controversies which
revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally
committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of the
Executive Branch."'1 2 The court then applied the landmark Baker v. Carr
test for analyzing whether a claim presents a political question and deter-
mined that because adjudication of the plaintiffs' antitrust claims would
require review of foreign policy decisions of the political branches, a non-
justiciable political question was presented. 13 While "a court may ex-
amine the merits of a case that touches on a foreign policy in some in-
stances, such as where a statutory scheme exists to guide the court's
determination of an issue," the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Sherman
and Clayton Acts do not provide sufficiently manageable standards to
allow for such review. 14 The court thus affirmed the district court's dis-
missal on political question grounds. 15
The court alternatively held that the act of state doctrine, pursuant to
which "'the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of
8. Id. at 505, 507-08. The court noted that had the complaint merely alleged that the
anticompetitive behavior "substantially affected interstate commerce," without including
facts in support of the allegation, the complaint would have been insufficient. Id. at
506-07.
9. Spectrum Stores, Inc. v. Citgo Petrol. Corp., 632 F.3d 938, 942-43 (5th Cir. 2011).
10. Id. at 944, 947.
11. Id. at 948.
12. Id. at 949 (quoting Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230
(1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
13. Id. at 949-50 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
14. Id. at 952.
15. Id. at 954, 956.
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the government of another, done within its own territory,"' barred con-
sideration of the plaintiffs' claims because "adjudication of th[e] suit
would necessarily call into question the acts of foreign governments with
respect to exploitation of their natural resources. 1'16 The court therefore
affirmed the district court's dismissal on act of state grounds. 17
C. ISSUE PRECLUSION
In Chavers v. Hall, the Southern District of Texas considered the
preclusive effect of dismissed claims on subsequently pleaded antitrust
claims.18 The plaintiff towing companies alleged that the cities of Bryan
and College Station and their respective agents had conspired to remove
the plaintiffs from the cities' non-consent towing lists. The plaintiffs al-
leged civil rights and RICO violations, libel, business disparagement, civil
conspiracy, and abuse of process. The court held that the plaintiffs
should take nothing on their claims and that those claims should be dis-
missed with prejudice.19
After the court issued its rulings, but before entry of final judgment,
the plaintiffs filed a second lawsuit against the same defendants based
upon the same facts and circumstances. When the defendants moved to
dismiss the second suit on claim preclusion grounds, the plaintiffs dis-
missed the original defendants, named new defendants, and added claims
for violations of state and federal antitrust laws, tortious interference with
business relationships, and malicious prosecution in addition to civil
rights violations and civil conspiracy. 20
The newly named defendants moved for dismissal. Three were con-
nected with the cities' police departments-the successor Chief of Police
for the City of College Station, the successor Chief of Police for the City
of Bryan, and a City of Bryan police officer. The court held that these
new defendants were in privity with the prior police chiefs and with the
cities, all of whom were defendants in the original lawsuit, and that the
plaintiffs' antitrust claims were based upon "the same nucleus of opera-
tive facts alleged" in the original lawsuit. 21 The court therefore con-
cluded that the plaintiffs could not "avoid the preclusive effect of [the
original lawsuit] merely by raising different legal theories on that same
set of alleged facts." 22
Another group of newly named defendants included a competitor tow-
ing company and related parties (the competitor defendants). The com-
petitor defendants alleged that a "special relationship" existed between
them and the original defendants such that they were entitled to claim
16. Id. at 954 (quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897)).
17. Id. at 956.
18. Chavers v. Hall, No. H-10-3922, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63649, at *9-10 (S.D. Tex.
June 16, 2011).
19. Id. at *3.
20. Id. at *4.
21. Id. at *12-16.
22. Id. at *17-18.
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preclusion.23 The district court relied upon Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon
Corp. and Gambocz v. Yelencsics for the proposition that claim preclu-
sion applies where a plaintiff in one lawsuit brings a second lawsuit
against new defendants based upon the same essential allegations and
seeking essentially the same relief.24 In Gambocz, the newly named de-
fendants were "so close to parties to the first complaint that the second
complaint was merely a repetition" of the first lawsuit. 25 Noting that (1)
the last live complaint in the original lawsuit and the live complaint in the
case before it contained the same basic factual allegations; (2) the com-
petitor towing company had been named in the original lawsuit as a con-
spirator; (3) the newly-pleaded antitrust claim was merely a substitution
for the original RICO claim based upon the same nucleus of operative
facts; and (4) the plaintiffs had ample information to sue the competitor
defendants in the original suit,26 the court determined that there was suf-
ficient privity to bar claims against the competitor defendants.
27
D. WALKER PROCESS
Aguirre v. Powerchute Sports, LLC was a patent dispute involving a
physical conditioning aid for golfers. 28 The plaintiff originally brought
suit for patent infringement and then amended to add a Walker Process
claim alleging attempted monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act by enforcement of a patent procured by fraud. The defend-
ants moved for dismissal on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to
allege any action to enforce the patent in question or any other act of
monopolization.2 9
The magistrate judge found, and the district court agreed, that the
plaintiff's complaint alleged only marketing of the defendants' product as
a patented design, which had a legitimate business justification.30 The
plaintiff also pointed to a letter from the defendants' counsel in response
to a demand letter from the plaintiff's counsel. Because neither action
was an attempt to enforce the patent and because the plaintiff failed to
allege (1) any other "predatory or anti-competitive conduct or" (2) "a
dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power," the plaintiff failed
to state a claim under Section 2.31
23. Id. at *18.
24. Id. at *18-19 (citing Lubrizol v. Exxon Corp., 871 F.2d 1279, 1288 (5th Cir. 1989);
Gambocz v. Yelencisis, 468 F.2d 837, 842 (3d Cir. 1972)).
25. Id. at *20 (quoting Gambocz, 468 F.2d at 842) (internal quotation marks omitted).
26. In fact, the plaintiffs had attempted to file a fourth amended complaint in that suit
adding the competitor defendants. Id. at *21.
27. Id. at *20-21, 23-24.
28. The case was referred to a U.S. magistrate judge for pretrial matters. The magis-
trate judge's report and recommendation is available at Aguirre v. Powerchute Sports,
LLC, No. SA-10-CV-0702-XR, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65003 (W.D. Tex. June 17, 2011)
and the district court's opinion is available at Aguirre v. Powerchute Sports, LLC, No. SA-
10-CV-0702-XR, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86207 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 4,2011).
29. Aguirre, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86207 at *8.




E. CHANGES TO FTC/DOJ GUIDELINES
In 2010, the FTC and DOJ issued new horizontal merger guidelines "to
help the agencies identify and challenge competitively harmful mergers
while avoiding unnecessary interference with mergers that either are
competitively beneficial or likely will have no competitive impact on the
marketplace. ' 32 The guidelines were intended to "better reflect the agen-
cies' actual practices" and "provide businesses with an even greater un-
derstanding of how [the FTC and DOJ] review transactions. '33 Changes
included clarifying that merger analysis is a fact-specific process using a
variety of analytical tools, "[u]pdat[ing] the concentration thresholds that
determine whether a transaction warrants further scrutiny by the agen-
cies," better explaining how the agencies evaluate the evidence, and
"[a]dd[ing] new sections on powerful buyers, mergers between competing
buyers, and partial acquisitions. ' '34
In the summer of 2011, the agencies amended the Hart-Scott-Rodino
premerger notification rules and report form effective August 18, 2011.35
The FTC announced that the purpose of the amendment was "to stream-
line the Form and capture new information that will help the FTC and the
... [DOJI . . .conduct their initial review of a proposed transaction's
competitive impact. 36
III. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES - CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT
Noteworthy DTPA decisions during the Survey period examined con-
sumer status, distinguishing between breach of contract cases and DTPA
cases, negating reliance and causation, damages, and the dischargeability
of DTPA awards in bankruptcy.
A. CONSUMER STATUS
To bring a DTPA claim, a plaintiff must be a "consumer. '37 Determin-
ing consumer status continues to be a focus of court decisions.
1. Borrowers Seeking Loan Modifications
During the Survey period, borrowers continued to petition courts to
recognize consumer status in the context of failed loan modifications, and
the courts continued to reject such efforts.
32. Press Release, FTC, Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice




35. Premerger Notification, 76 Fed. Reg. 42, 471 (July 19, 2011) (to be codified at 16
C.F.R. pt. 801, 802, 803).
36. Id.
37. A consumer is a one who seeks or acquires goods or services by purchase or lease.
Tux. Bus. COM. CoDE ANN. § 17.45(4) (West 2011). Those goods or services must form
the basis of the complaint. Id. § 17.50.
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In a series of cases, including Ayers v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC,38
Manno v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP,39 and Watson v. Citimortgage,
Inc.,40 the courts consistently dismissed borrowers' DTPA claims against
their mortgage companies due to lack of consumer status. In each case,
the borrower complained that its mortgage company or loan servicer vio-
lated the DTPA by failing to process loan modifications.
Generally, a person does not qualify as a DTPA consumer if the under-
lying transaction is a loan because money is considered neither a good
nor a service. 41 Modifications of existing loans also are not DTPA goods
or services. 42 Nor does obtaining an extension of credit qualify one as a
"consumer." 43
In Flenniken v. Longview Bank and Trust Co., the Texas Supreme
Court had permitted a borrower to sue its lender for DTPA violations.
44
As a result, Flenniken is often cited by borrowers as a way to circumvent
the holdings of Riverside and its progeny.45 Flenniken, however, is in
large part limited to its facts. 46 "Flenniken represents the category of
cases in which a loan is connected to the purchase of a good, which is the
objective of the transaction," such that the plaintiff can be considered a
consumer "who seeks or acquires by purchase ... any goods." 47
In Flenniken, the "good" in question was a home.48 Before the bor-
rowers bought the home, they entered into a loan transaction with a
homebuilder who financed the transaction with a note and a deed of
trust. The builder then assigned that note and deed of trust to a savings
and loan company in order to obtain a construction loan. The
homebuilder abandoned construction before completing the home, and
the Flennikens stopped making their loan payments. Foreclosure soon
followed. The Flennikens sued the savings and loan company, alleging
violations of the DTPA for unconscionable conduct. The court held the
bank liable under the DTPA without overruling Riverside.49 To do so,
the court viewed the transaction from the buyer's perspective and held
38. Ayers v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, 787 F. Supp. 2d 451, 455 (E.D. Tex. 2011).
39. Manno v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, No. A-Il-CA-347-LY, 2011 WL
3844900, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2011).
40. Watson v. Citimortgage, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 2d 726, 735 (E.D. Tex. 2011).
41. Walker v. FDIC, 970 F.2d 114, 123-24 (5th Cir. 1992); Riverside Nat'l Bank v.
Lewis, 603 S.W.2d 169, 174, 176 (Tex. 1980).
42. See La Sara Grain Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Mercedes, 673 S.W.2d 558, 567 (Tex.
1984); Fix v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 242 S.W.3d 147, 160 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, pet.
denied); Maginn v. Norwest Mortg., Inc., 919 S.W.2d 164, 167 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, no
writ).
43. Riverside Nat'l Bank, 603 S.W.2d at 174, 176.
44. Flenniken v. Longview Bank & Trust Co., 661 S.W.2d 705, 706 (Tex. 1983).
45. See, e.g., Bennett v. Bank United, 114 S.W.3d 75, 79-81 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003,
no pet.); Hand v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 889 S.W.2d 483, 499 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
46. See FDIC v. Munn, 804 F.2d 860, 864-65 (5th Cir. 1986).
47. See id. at 865 (quoting Flenniken, 661 S.W.2d at 706) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
48. Flenniken, 661 S.W.2d at 707.
49. Id. at 707-08.
20121
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that the plaintiffs were consumers because they "did not seek to borrow
money; they sought to acquire a house. '50
In Ayers, the court dismissed the borrower's DTPA claim because he
was not a consumer.5' The court reasoned that Ayers was not seeking a
loan for the purpose of obtaining a good or service; Ayers already had the
home. Rather, Ayers sought only a modification of his existing loan.52
Therefore, Ayers fell squarely within the line of cases finding no con-
sumer status in loan situations.5 3 Unlike the borrowers in Flenniken,
Ayers was not seeking to purchase a good; he sought only "refinancing
services." '54 Citing Broyles v. Chase Home Finance55 and Cavil v.
Trendmaker Homes, Inc., 56 also decided during the Survey period, the
court concluded that "[r]efinancing is simply an extension of credit that
does not qualify Plaintiff as a consumer. ' 57 Accordingly, the court dis-
missed Ayers's DTPA claim. 58
In Manno, the borrower fell behind on his mortgage, and his efforts to
refinance that loan failed. 59 His bank eventually foreclosed, and in re-
sponse, Manno sued his bank for violations of the DTPA. The bank
moved to dismiss Manno's DTPA claim. In response, Manno relied on
Flenniken to argue that he qualified as a consumer because the home he
was trying to save qualified as a "good" and the home was the basis of his
complaint. Manno also argued that "his claims d[id] not pertain to a loan
application or the attempt to seek a loan modification. '60
The court held Flenniken inapplicable as Manno was in fact com-
plaining about his lender's failure to extend credit to him or otherwise to
re-negotiate his loan as allegedly promised. The court concluded as a
matter of law that Manno's home simply was not the basis of his com-
plaint and, therefore, that Manno did not qualify as a consumer.61 As a
result, the court dismissed Manno's DTPA claim. 62
Similarly, in Watson, the borrowers claimed that they were DTPA con-
sumers because they were led to believe that their home loan would be
modified, but their mortgage company instead accelerated the loan and
50. Id. at 708.
51. Ayers v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, 787 F. Supp. 2d 451, 455 (E.D. Tex. 2011).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. (citing Flenniken, 661 S.W.2d at 706-07).
55. Broyles v. Chase Homes Fin., No. 3:10-CV2256-G, 2011 WL 1428904, at *4 (N.D.
Tex. Apr. 13, 2011) (holding that "subsequent actions related to mortgage accounts-for
example, extensions of further credit or modifications of the original loan-do not satisfy
the 'good or services' element of the DTPA").
56. Cavil v. Trendmaker Homes, Inc., No. G-10-304, 2010 WL 5464238, at *4 (S.D.
Tex. Dec. 29, 2010) (holding that "a mortgage or modification of a mortgage is not a good
or service under the DTPA").
57. Ayers, 787 F. Supp. 2d at 455.
58. Id.
59. Manno v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, No. A-11-CA-347-LY, 2011 WL
3844900, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2011).
60. Id. at *4.
61. Id. at *5.
62. ld.
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attempted foreclosure.63 The court granted the mortgage company's mo-
tion to dismiss Watson's DTPA claim for failure to state a claim because
the Watsons were not consumers.64 The court reasoned that the Watsons
were not consumers because "borrowing money does not constitute the
acquisition of a good or service. 65
2. Assignees, Heirs, and Incidental Beneficiaries
Assignees, heirs, and incidental beneficiaries was another class of liti-
gants analyzed during the Survey period for consumer status. Each was
held not to qualify as a DTPA consumer. In the context of assignees and
heirs, the courts relied on PPG Industries, Inc. v. JMB/Houston Centers
Partners Ltd. Partnership, in which the Texas Supreme Court held that
"the personal and punitive aspects of DTPA claims cannot be squared
with a rule allowing them to be assigned as if they were mere property. '66
In Encompass Office Solutions, Inc. v. Ingenix, Inc., Encompass sought
payment for medical equipment and nurse services that it provided to
physicians for the care of various patients insured by United.67 The pa-
tients executed Assignment of Benefits forms in favor of Encompass, and
pursuant to such assignments, Encompass sought payment from United.
Claiming Encompass was double-billing, United refused to pay, and En-
compass sued. Among Encompass's claims were DTPA claims. The
court granted United's motion to dismiss Encompass's DTPA claims due
to lack of consumer status.68
As an initial matter, Encompass was not a consumer in its own right.
Although Encompass provided goods and services pursuant to an insur-
ance policy, Encompass was not the direct purchaser of goods or services.
Its only relation to the policy was to receive or otherwise seek the pro-
ceeds of such policy.69 Following PPG Industries, the court also rejected
Encompass's argument that it could bring its DTPA claim as an assignee
of its patients, who did qualify as consumers, because DTPA claims are
generally not assignable.70
The Texas Supreme Court has not yet addressed survivability of DTPA
63. Watson v. Citimortgage, Inc., No. 4:10-CV-707, 2011 WL 4526980, at *1 (E.D. Tex.
Sept. 30, 2011).
64. Id. at *7.
65. Id. (citing Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 603 S.W.2d 169, 174-75 (Tex. 1980)
(holding that (1) money is not "tangible chattel" or a "good" under the DTPA; (2) borrow-
ing money is not seeking or acquiring any services; and (3) any "attempt to acquire money,
or the use of money, [i]s not an attempt to acquire services")).
66. PPG Indus., Inc. v. JMB/Houston Ctrs. Partners Ltd. P'ship, 146 S.W.3d 79, 82
(Tex. 2004) (holding that DTPA claims cannot be assigned).
67. Encompass Office Solutions, Inc. v. Ingenix, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 2d 938, 946 (E.D.
Tex. 2011). Defendants, UnitedHealth Group, Inc. and United Healthcare Services, Inc.,
were collectively referred to by the court as "United." Id.
68. Id. at 962.




claims. 71 Therefore, whether an heir of a DTPA consumer can qualify as
a DTPA consumer in order to bring forward the decedent's DTPA claim
presently depends on the court in which the claim is heard, because there
is a split among the intermediate Texas appellate courts on this issue. 72
During the Survey period, the San Antonio Court of Appeals addressed
the issue in Texas Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Rogers, which
arose from a home fire.73 The home owner sued her insurer for nonpay-
ment of policy proceeds and DTPA violations, but died prior to trial, and
her children proceeded in her place. The court of appeals followed its
own precedent, holding that DTPA claims do not survive the consumer's
death and cannot be brought by the consumer's estate.7 4 The court of
appeals reiterated that DTPA recovery is both personal and punitive in
nature. 75
B. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN BREACH OF CONTRACT
AND DTPA CLAIMS
It is not uncommon for a party defending against a DTPA claim to
argue that the facts of a case give rise, at most, to a breach of contract
claim and not a DTPA claim. While both claims allow for an award of
attorneys' fees to a prevailing claimant,76 defending a breach of contract
claim may be preferred because there is no exposure to double or treble
damages for knowing or intentional conduct.77 Defending a breach of
contract claim may also be preferable if the contract sets venue or limits
available damages.
An allegation of a mere breach of contract, "without more, 78 does not
constitute a false, misleading, or deceptive act in violation of the DTPA. 79
71. PPG Indus., Inc. v. JMP/Houston Ctrs. Partners Ltd. P'ship, 146 S.W.3d 79, 91
(Tex. 2004) (stating "Because only an assignment is before us, we do not decide whether
DTPA claims survive to a consumer's heirs, a related but sometimes distinct inquiry.").
72. McCoy v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 4:09-CV-496, 2010 WL 3365110, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Aug.
25, 2010) (adopting magistrate's recommendations set forth in McCoy v. Pfizer, Inc., No.
4:09-CV-496, 2010 WL 3365284, at *4-6 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2010) (collecting cases)).
73. Tex. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 351 S.W.3d 103, 105 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 2011, pet. denied).
74. Id. at 107 (following Lukasik v. San Antonio Blue Haven Pools, Inc., 21 S.W.3d
394, 402 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet.); Mendoza v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co., 932
S.W.2d 605, 609 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ); and First Nat'l Bank of Kerrville
v. Hackworth, 673 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ)).
75. Id.
76. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001(8) (West 2008); TEx. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 17.50(d) (West 2011).
77. Under the DTPA, if the defendant's violation is found to be committed "know-
ingly" then the jury may award additional damages up to three times the amount of eco-
nomic damages awarded. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (West 2011). If the
defendant's violation was "intentional[ I" then the additional damages may be in an
amount not more than three times the economic and mental anguish damages. Id.
78. Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc., v. Lubbock Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 987 S.W.2d 50,
53 (Tex. 1998); Crawford v. Ace Sign, Inc., 917 S.W.2d 12, 14 (Tex. 1996) (quoting Ashford
Dev., Inc. v. USLife Real Estate Servs. Corp., 661 S.W.2d 933, 935 (Tex. 1983)).
79. See also Ken Petrol. Corp. v. Questor Drilling Corp., 24 S.W.3d 344, 357 (Tex.
2000) (holding contract's indemnity provision was an agreement and not misrepresentation
that agreement conferred rights and benefits that it did not have in violation of the DTPA);
[Vol. 65
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During the Survey period, Texas courts once again examined what
''more" is needed to transform a contract-related claim from a mere
breach of contract claim to a DTPA claim.
In Drury Southwest, Inc. v. Louie Ledeaux #1, Inc., the San Antonio
Court of Appeals examined whether a misrepresentation made during
contract negotiations and effectively woven into the terms of the ensuing
contract gave rise to a DTPA claim.80 The parties had negotiated a lease
permitting Ledeaux to operate a restaurant on property owned by Drury.
During the negotiations, Drury promised that Ledeaux could install a
large "reader board" sign on the premises. The resulting lease detailed
what steps would be followed to erect the sign. Drury also agreed to
build a patio on the existing restaurant space.8 1
During lease negotiations, Drury failed to disclose that it previously
had been embroiled in a three-year dispute with the City of San Antonio
regarding the erection of another sign on the property, and that ulti-
mately the City had denied Drury's sign permit application. Drury also
failed to disclose that some of the property on which the patio was to be
built was not owned by Drury. Finally, Drury withheld from Ledeaux
that an exit ramp off of the nearest highway would soon be closed
permanently. 82
Ledeaux's restaurant failed, and Ledeaux's owners requested a change
in restaurant format. Days after this request, Drury filed an application
for a temporary restraining order against Ledeaux. Ledeaux countered
with several claims, including a breach of contract claim and DTPA
claims, and was ultimately awarded actual damages and additional dam-
ages for Drury's knowing conduct. 83
On appeal, Drury argued that the evidence was legally insufficient to
support a finding that Drury engaged in conduct actionable under the
DTPA.84 Drury further argued that the alleged misrepresentation re-
garding the ability to erect a sign on the property was merely an oral
Conquest Drilling Fluids, Inc. v. Tri-Flo Int'l, Inc., 137 S.W.3d 299, 309 (Tex. App.-Beau-
mont 2004, no pet.) (holding failure to fulfill promise to build unit free of defects did not
state violation of DTPA); Cont'l Dredging, Inc. v. De-Kaizered, Inc., 120 S.W.3d 380, 390
(Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, pet. denied) (holding misrepresentations that contract had
been performed when it. allegedly had not been gave rise to breach of contract only, not
DTPA violation); Wayne Duddlesten, Inc. v. Highland Ins. Co., 110 S.W.3d 85, 92 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (holding alleged misrepresentations stem-
ming from failure to comply with policy was not violation of DTPA).
80. Drury Sw., Inc. v. Louie, Ledeaux #1, Inc., 350 S.W.3d 287, 291 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 2011, pet. denied).
81. Id. at 290.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. The jury considered whether Drury (1) misrepresented legal rights; (2) failed to
disclose information; (3) engaged in false advertising; and (4) misrepresented the uses,
benefits or quality of the leased premises. Id. at 290-91; see TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN.
§§ 17.46(a), (b)(5), (b)(9), (b)(24) (West 2011).
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statement that Drury would perform its obligations under the lease.85
The evidence showed, however, that (1) Drury told Ledeaux that it
could install whatever sign it wanted to on the premises; (2) Drury knew
what the sign would look like; and (3) the City of San Antonio had de-
nied a prior application for a permit to install a sign on the premises.
Taken together, the court of appeals reasoned that Drury misrepresented
that Ledeaux could erect the sign Ledeaux envisioned. Moreover, the
court of appeals deemed the misrepresentation material because the evi-
dence also showed that Ledeaux's owners testified that they believed that
the sign was "essential to the success of the restaurant. '8 6
It was this misrepresentation that proved essential to Ledeaux's DTPA
claim. A misrepresentation made during contract negotiations may form
the basis of a DTPA claim if the defendant misrepresented a material fact
about the goods or services sold to the plaintiff.87 Here, the evidence
showed that Drury made such material misrepresentation regarding
Ledeaux's ability to erect a sign on the premises. This was more than just
a promise to perform the terms of the lease and constituted that some-
thing "more" needed to give rise to a DTPA claim. Therefore, the court
of appeals affirmed the DTPA judgment.88
C. NEGATING RELIANCE AND CAUSATION
To recover under certain provisions of the DTPA, a consumer must
prove that the defendant's actions were the "producing cause" of the con-
sumer's damage.8 9 "Producing cause" requires proof that the acts in
question be both a cause-in-fact and a "substantial factor" in causing inju-
ries that would not have occurred otherwise. 90 The consumer also must
show reliance on the false, misleading, or deceptive act or practice. 91
Mewhinney v. London Wineman92 addressed whether a consumer's
pre-purchase inspection negated causation and reliance. The parties' dis-
pute concerned the sale of five bottles of vintage wine. Mewhinney put
85. Drury Sw., Inc., 350 S.W.2d at 291(citing Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas,
Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 478 (Tex. 1995); Church & Dwight Co. v. Huey, 961 S.W.2d 560, 567
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, pet. denied)).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 292.
89. See TEX. Bus. & COM CODE ANN. § 17.50(a) (West 2011).
A consumer may maintain an action where any of the following constitute a
producing cause of economic damages or damages for mental anguish: (1)
the use or employment by any person of a false, misleading, or deceptive act
or practice that is:
(A) specifically enumerated in a subdivision of Subsection (b) of Section
17.46 of this subchapter; and
(B) relied on by a consumer to the consumer's detriment. Id. (emphasis
added).
90. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jefferson Assocs., Ltd., 896 S.W.2d 156, 161 (Tex.
1995).
91. Id.
92. Mewhinney v. London Wineman, Inc., 339 S.W.3d 177, 177 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2011, pet. denied).
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the contents of his wine cellar up for sale and represented that he owned
and was selling five bottles of 1945 Chateau Mouton Rothschild wine.
The London Wineman responded to Mewhinney's advertisement and
sent two employees to inspect the wine collection to determine whether
Mewhinney's wine could be resold. The employees confirmed that
Mewhinney's collection included five bottles of alleged vintage Mouton
Rothschild. One bottle of Mouton Rothschild appeared suspect. Upon
closer inspection, however, the employees concluded the five bottles were
authentic and purchased Mewhinney's entire collection on behalf of The
London Wineman. Soon after its purchase, The London Wineman
learned that the four Chateau Mouton Rothschild bottles that had not
been inspected were counterfeit and then sued Mewhinney when he re-
fused to refund the money paid for the counterfeit bottles. 93
While the court dismissed The London Wineman's breach of contract
claim against Mewhinney, the jury assessed $24,000 in damages to The
London Wineman based on its DTPA claim.94 After the verdict,
Mewhinney moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which
was denied.9s
On appeal, Mewhinney argued that there was no evidence that he en-
gaged in false, misleading, or deceptive act or practices because there was
no evidence that he substituted one brand of wine for another or that the
wine sold was not authentic.96 For these reasons, Mewhinney argued
there was no evidence to support a DTPA award. 97
The Dallas Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that there was suffi-
cient evidence to conclude that the wine was counterfeit and to find that
Mewhinney engaged in false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices
when he claimed to own five bottles of 1945 Chateau Mouton Roths-
child. 98 The court further held that the claim arose from Mewhinney's
misrepresentation that he owned five bottles of 1945 Chateau Mouton
Rothschild, and therefore, the misrepresentation about the wine's vintage
was separate and apart from the sales contract executed between the par-
ties. Thus, the claim was properly raised as a DTPA claim as opposed to
a breach of contract claim.99
Mewhinney also argued that there was no evidence of detrimental reli-
ance on any false, misleading, or deceptive act or practice and that any
93. Id. at 180. The London Wineman paid $6,000 for each bottle of 1945 Chateau
Mouton Rothschild wine. Id. at 179-80.
94. Mewhinney argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict because the DTPA claim was merely a dressed up breach of
contract claim. The court of appeals disagreed, finding the misrepresentations at issue
were separate and apart from the sales contract and therefore actionable under the DTPA.
Id. at 181.
95. Id. at 180.




99. Id. at 181.
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such reliance was not the producing cause of damage to The London
Wineman. Mewhinney reasoned that The London Wineman's pre-
purchase inspection of the wine bottles negated any reliance on any state-
ment by Mewhinney and, moreover, negated causation. 100
The court of appeals once again disagreed with Mewhinney. While an
independent inspection can negate causation, the buyer must rely exclu-
sively on the independent examination as the basis for the purchase, and
such inspection should: (1) reveal the truth regarding the purchase and
(2) indicate that the buyer was not relying on the information provided
by the seller.' 0 ' In this case, the evidence showed that when it made the
decision to purchase the bottles, The London Wineman relied on
Mewhinney's representation that the wine cellar contained the five vin-
tage bottles when it made the decision to purchase the bottles. The evi-
dence also showed that the purpose of the prepurchase inspection was
only to determine fitness for resale, not authenticity. This evidence
demonstrated that The London Wineman relied on Mewhinney's repre-
sentation and not on its own inspection when deciding to purchase the
wine. Therefore, the inspection "did not supplant Mewhinney's represen-
tations" and was not broad enough in scope to "reveal the truth about the
wine." 102
Williams v. Dardenne examined whether an "as is" clause was valid,
and if so, whether it negated causation and reliance. 10 3 The buyers of a
home sold as is sued the sellers for failure to disclose an inspection that
addressed the home's foundation problems. The sellers disclosed three
inspection reports revealing some foundation problems but did not dis-
close a letter from Knight Engineering that detailed repairs the firm
could perform on the house. 10 4
The home's foundation problems became very evident after only a few
months. The buyers hired Knight Engineering to inspect their foundation
and for the first time learned of Knight Engineering's prior letter to the
sellers. The buyers then sued the sellers, and a jury found in favor of the
buyers on their DTPA claims. The sellers moved for a judgment notwith-
standing the verdict, arguing that the "as is" clause barred the buyers'
recovery.' 0 5
A valid "as is" clause may negate reliance and causation in a DTPA
claim; however, if induced by misrepresentation, it does not protect a
seller from liability.' 0 6 The buyers argued that the "as-is" clause was not
100. Id. at 182.
101. Id. at 182-83 (citing Bernstein v. Thomas, 298 S.W.3d 817, 822 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2009, no pet); Pleasant v. Bradford, 260 S.W.3d 546, 554 (Tex. App.-Austin 2008, pet.
denied); Dubow v. Dragon, 746 S.W.2d 857, 860 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ)).
102. Id. at 183.
103. Williams v. Dardenne, 345 S.W.3d 118, 119-20 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2011, pet. denied).
104. Id. at 120.
105. Id. at 122-23.
106. Id. at 124 (citing Prudential v. Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jefferson Assocs., Ltd., 896
S.W.2d 156, 161 (Tex. 1995)).
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valid because it was procured by fraud insofar as the sellers fraudulently
concealed the foundation's condition by withholding Knight Engineer-
ing's letter. The relevant question then became whether the nondisclo-
sure of the letter from Knight Engineering caused the buyers to purchase
the home as is. 10 7
While the buyers testified that they would not have bought the home if
they knew of the condition of the foundation or the need to repair it, the
Houston Court of Appeals held that such testimony simply was not evi-
dence that the buyers would not have purchased the home had the
Knight Engineering letter been disclosed by the sellers. The court of ap-
peals also pointed out that the three inspection reports that had been
disclosed were in large part duplicative of the information in the Knight
Engineering letter. The fact that there was evidence that the buyers had
not read all disclosed inspection reports further supported a finding of no
fraudulent inducement.108
The court of appeals thus held that the trial court erred in failing to
grant the sellers' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the
fraudulent inducement claim. Because the "as is" clause was not negated
by fraudulent inducement, it was valid and negated the causation and re-
liance elements of the buyers' DTPA claim. Accordingly, the court of
appeals reversed and rendered on the buyers' DTPA claim. 10 9
D. DAMAGES
In Drury Southwest, Inc. v. Louie Ledeaux #1, Inc., discussed above,
the San Antonio Court of Appeals also examined the scope of damages
available in a DTPA case and whether the jury's award was supported by
sufficient evidence." 0 The jury had awarded Ledeaux $625,000 in actual
damages and $450,000 in additional damages for Drury's knowing con-
duct. The parties agreed that Ledeaux invested approximately $400,000
in the failed restaurant, leaving $225,000 in dispute. The court of appeals
rejected the argument that the $225,000 difference was compensable to
Ledeaux based on the "sweat equity" of its owners. Without deciding
whether the equivalent of "sweat equity" is indeed compensable under
the DTPA, the court held that Ledeaux could not recover for the time
invested by its owners, especially when the compensation paid to the
owners for their labor was already reflected in the $400,000 that was not
in dispute.1 1' The case was remanded to the trial court on the issue of
damages.1' 2
107. Id. at 125-27.
108. Id. at 128-29.
109. Id. at 129.
110. Drury Sw., Inc. v. Louie Ledeaux #1, Inc., 350 S.W.3d 287, 292-93 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 2011, pet. denied).
111. Id. at 293 (citing Wingate v. Hajdik, 795 S.W.2d 717, 719 (Tex. 1990)).
112. Id. at 292-93. The court also granted Ledeaux's motion for rehearing requesting
remand for a re-election of remedies presumably in the event recovery was higher on other
claims for which the jury awarded damages in Ledeaux's favor. Id. at 293.
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E. DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY
In re Home examined whether collateral estoppel applied to the deter-
mination that, as a matter of law, a DTPA judgment was non-dischargea-
ble in bankruptcy. 1 3 The debtor and his creditors filed cross-motions for
summary judgment on the issue of collateral estoppel, and both motions
were denied.1 1 4
In the underlying case, the plaintiffs prevailed in a suit against a
homebuilder. The resulting arbitration award included damages for
knowing and intentional misrepresentations by the homebuilder in viola-
tion of the DTPA, as well as a finding of "no fraud." The arbitration
award was reduced to a final judgment, and the homebuilder filed for
bankruptcy. In the bankruptcy action, the plaintiffs alleged that their
judgment was non-dischargeable under Sections 523(a)(2)(A) and
523(a)(6) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.115
The plaintiffs argued that there was no need to relitigate whether the
award and judgment satisfied Sections 523(a)(2) and (a)(6), because the
finding of knowing or intentional conduct was sufficiently litigated and
relitigation was barred by collateral estoppel. The homebuilder argued
that there was no need to relitigate whether the award and judgment sat-
isfied Section 523(a)(2) because it required a finding of "actual fraud,"
which was negated in the award and judgment. 1 6
The award and judgment provided no detailed findings. The bank-
ruptcy court therefore held that there was insufficient detail from which
to discern whether the finding of intentional conduct in fact satisfied the
elements of Section 523(a)(2)(A), which called for actual fraud, or Sec-
tion 523(a)(6), which called for "willful and malicious injury. 11 7 The ar-
bitrator's award thus could not be given preclusive effect on either
issue.118 The court did not provide guidance on what level of detail
would sufficiently insulate a future judgment holder from having to reliti-
gate the dischargeability of a DTPA award in bankruptcy.
IV. CONCLUSION
It was a quiet year for both antitrust and Texas DTPA litigation. Sig-
nificant decisions heard during the Survey period illustrated and tested
the contours and limitations of the relevant statutes. While antitrust deci-
sions appeared to protect and serve the public by managing the scope of
litigation before the courts, Texas DTPA decisions foreclosed the court
option altogether for any class of litigants that could not demonstrate the
113. In re Home, Bankruptcy No. 10-50859-C, 2011 WL 350473, at *1 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex. Feb. 2, 2011).
114. Id. at *10.
115. Id. at *2. The plaintiffs also alleged the judgment was non-dischargeable under
§ 5 2 3 (a)(4), which applies in fiduciary contexts. Id.
116. Id. at *3.
117. Id. at *2, 10.
118. Id. at *10.
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requisite consumer status. Whether such DTPA decisions effectively pro-
mote consumer welfare is unclear. Barring that hurdle, however, the
DTPA appears to have a strong foothold in Texas case law and provides
litigants with an alternative cause of action nicely falling somewhere be-
tween breach of contract and fraud.
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